After Gujarat and Karnataka, adherents of the Congress have blamed defeat on the party's failure to project State-level leaders. The 'regionalisation' of national parties is being touted as the model for tomorrow.

Admittedly, there is some truth in this. In the absence of a towering all-India personality who has an appeal across States -- in 1999, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee was winning incremental votes for his NDA allies in even Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, States that are scarcely BJP strongholds -- voters will inevitably look for an accessible leader who speaks the local idiom.

As such, when the Congress sought to paint the Gujarat election as a contest between Mr Narendra Modi and Ms Sonia Gandhi, it surrendered early. Likewise, in Karnataka, the BJP positioned itself as Mr BS Yeddiyurappa's party -- while the Congress sold itself as everything from Mrs Indira Gandhi's legatee to a consortium of half-a-dozen State-level leaders all of whom cancelled out each other.

Yet, it would be facile to conclude that it is inability to understand these federal impulses that, alone, is responsible for the Congress's recent setbacks.

For a start, the structure the BJP is putting in shape is hardly new. It was the template for the Congress in the 1950s and 1960s, when the party had strong State-level leaders -- BC Roy in West Bengal, K Kamaraj in Tamil Nadu, Morarji Desai in the old Bombay State.

Second, over the past decade or so, both national parties have become comfortable with the idea of leading alliances of regional parties. If the BJP can live with a Naveen Patnaik and the Congress with a Sharad Pawar within their respective coalitions, it is only a matter of time before they concede similar autonomous space within the party itself. Otherwise regional energies and aspirations will simply migrate elsewhere.

Internal federalism is, thus, an evolutionary step rather than a breach from the past. To be fair, neither national party has entirely understood the theory behind it. The BJP move towards localised election campaigns has been accidental, driven by the near simultaneous arrival of a clutch of strong State leaders and by the erosion of central authority.

Indeed, if the promotion of regional satraps were to be accepted as axiomatic by the BJP, Mr Babulal Marandi would still have been leading the party in Jharkhand. That aside, if in the coming years the BJP throws up a strong national leader, with mass following across States, the equation could again change.

If the BJP has extolled internal regionalism almost post facto, the Congress has been in denial. The best example of the party tolerating a local leader with a robust but socially limited base is in Andhra Pradesh. Here, Mr YS Rajasekhara Reddy contested and won the 2004 Assembly election as an alternative Telugu strongman to Mr N Chandrababu Naidu. Mr Reddy is a magnet for Reddy voters, just as Mr Naidu's Telugu Desam is Kamma-centric and the movie star Chiranjeevi's possible party will be built around Kapus.

Nevertheless, it is not merely the promotion of regional leaders that is adequate. It is equally important that regional leaders are given necessary but not superfluous central support. Here the Congress needs to do two things -- reassess its management of State elections; and, address its overdue generational transition.

As Gujarat and now Karnataka have shown, the Congress's election managers are increasingly only Delhi-based, media-networked dilettantes. There is very little proactive strategic input they provide during a State election. In Karnataka, the leader deputed by Delhi spent his time making conciliatory phone calls to cajole and calm factions.

In the absence of directional clarity, the Congress resorted to quantity. Public meetings in small towns in the interiors of Karnataka were addressed by such worthies as Mr Kapil Sibal, Mr Subhash Yadav and Mr Santosh Bagrodia. They were hardly likely to swing votes. In contrast, the BJP used its principal non-Karnataka crowd-pullers, Ms Sushma Swaraj and Mr Narendra Modi, judiciously.

This winter, there are two big elections in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In 2003, Congress Governments were voted out in these States and this time, the Congress believes, the BJP will lose.

The Congress has failed to grasp that "anti-incumbency" by itself is no magic wand. Political adeptness, tactical flexibility, deft messaging and outreach, and an optimum social coalition are required to either exploit or reverse a given electoral trend.

If the BJP won in Jaipur and Bhopal in 2003 it wasn't just because the local Congress Governments were unpopular. The party deployed Pramod Mahajan and Mr Arun Jaitley to micromanage the campaigns. Two of the best minds in Indian politics were at work. In contrast, Congress election managers are largely paratroopers, dependent on television studio wisdom.

The Congress's second problem is related. The fulcrum of a political party is the generation that has a stake in its immediate future. The Congress has packed itself with 1980s leftovers. For instance, it is now convenient to say that if the party had forcefully projected Mr SM Krishna as Chief Minister, it would have done better in Karnataka. Evidence from the ground would suggest otherwise.

At 76, Mr Krishna's best years are behind him and even his hold over his fellow Vokkaligas is severely restricted. From Mr M Veerappa Moily to Mr CK Jaffer Sharief, the State Congress is loaded with inert pensioners.

Consider the Uttaranchal precedent. In 2002, when the Congress won the election there, it snubbed Mr Harish Rawat and anointed Mr ND Tiwari as Chief Minister. On the eve of the 2007 election, Mr Tiwari, by then 82, announced his retirement, and sat back as his party lost. Mr Rawat, 22 years Mr Tiwari's junior, was left carrying the can.

What of the Centre? The UPA Government is led by a Prime minister who will almost certainly not serve another term; its HRD Minister last won a popular election in 1991; its Home Minister lives in the past tense. The External Affairs Minister is at the end of an admittedly distinguished career.

The Congress has flagrantly ignored its talent in the crucial 45 to 60 age group. Aside from Mr Kamal Nath and Mr P Chidambaram, this segment has been given no front-ranking Ministries. In four years, incredibly, the party has found no Cabinet berths for Mr Digvijay Singh, Mr Ashok Gehlot or Mr Salman Khurshid. These are the people who will live to fight another day; unfortunately, a short-sighted leadership and a wilful old guard will leave them only scorched earth to defend.

Courtesy: www.dailypioneer.com, May 30, 2008